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Impact of product-design strategies on the operations of a closed-loop supply 
chain 
Abstract: This study investigates product design and its impact on the operations of a two-echelon closed-loop supply chain 
(CLSC). Research findings reveal that remanufacturing does not necessarily enhance the profitability of the supplier or the 
manufacturer, but adjusting product-design strategies helps to curb loss if profitability suffers. An environmental impact 
analysis identifies an interval for the base unit remanufacturing cost, within which remanufacturing is beneficial. We then 
obtain the condition under which the environmental impact can be mitigated by product design. These results shed insights for 
supply chain managers in their operational decisions and policy-makers in properly regulating remanufacturing activities. 
Keywords: Product-design strategy; Closed-loop supply chain; Remanufacturing; Environmental impact  
 
1. Introduction 
The goal of remanufacturing is to recover residual values by disassembling, cleaning, and recovering end-of-use products, 
thereby improving resource utilization and reducing environmental footprints. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
(1997) points out that remanufacturing can reduce raw material consumption and energy usage compared to regular 
manufacturing. Increased public awareness of and concerns about environmental impact and improved remanufacturing laws 
and regulations have resulted in rapid growth of the remanufacturing industry. In 2013, the annual sales of global 
remanufacturing industry were more than 150 billion U.S. dollars (Liu et al., 2017). Despite economic and environmental 
benefit of remanufacturing, some original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) remain reluctant to remanufacture their 
end-of-use products. Reasons that are cited include cannibalization of higher-margin new product sales and absence of proper 
infrastructure and expertise to collect and remanufacture used product profitably (Atasu et al., 2010; Ferguson and Toktay, 
2006). On the other hand, some other OEMs choose to offer remanufactured products (e.g. Apple, Caterpillar, Cummins) for 
the sake of enhancing profitability or brand social image (McConocha and Speh, 1991) despite that the increased product 
variety makes supply chain operations more complicated (Fisher and Ittner, 1999; Wan et al., 2017). Many studies show that 
the remanufacturing decision of OEMs is contingent upon the corresponding cost savings (Liu et al., 2017; Xiong et al., 2013; 
Zheng et al., 2019), which are closely related to product design (Desai et al., 2001; Gu et al., 2015; Joshi and Gupta, 2019). If 
products are not properly designed for remanufacturing, it is difficult and costly to remanufacture them later on (Hatcher et al., 
2011). Therefore, product design is a key factor that affects the efficiency of remanufacturing.  
To make a product remanufacturing-friendly, proper product design has to be considered in many different aspects, 
ranging from material selection, to process designs and ease for disassembling and cleaning. Therefore, 
remanufacturing-oriented product design typically involves different design features such as modularity (Mukhopadhyay and 
Setoputro, 2005), interchangeability (Wu, 2013), possible disassembly (Wu, 2012), commonality (Subramanian et al., 2013), 




speaking, remanufacturing-oriented product design interacts with other decisions such as collection (Atasu and Souza, 2013; 
Galbreth et al., 2013; Subramanian et al., 2013), remanufacturing (Reimann et al., 2019), and pricing strategies (Örsdemir et 
al., 2014; Wu, 2013). Existing studies show that a supply chain member, such as an OEM, may change its product-design 
strategy to deter its competitor from remanufacturing (Subramanian et al., 2013) or to attain win-win results for both parties 
(Wu, 2013). In addition, Gu et al. (2015) reveal that an OEM can adjust its product-design strategy to maximize its profits if it 
engages in remanufacturing. Therefore, product design proves to be an effective tool for a supply chain member to maximize 
its profit in a remanufacturing context. 
The aforesaid studies assume that an integrated manufacturer is responsible for the design and production of a single 
product. But in reality, many products are designed and produced by a non-integrated manufacturer and its suppliers. For 
instance, PC manufacturers purchase CPUs from Intel or AMD and memory chips from other external chipmakers to make 
their final products. Most Chinese automakers rely on external suppliers for high-quality key components such as engines, 
gearboxes, and tires. It is apparent that the success of these manufacturers depends on their key component suppliers. 
Empirical evidence has revealed that an increasing number of OEMs are interested in motivating their suppliers to participate 
in their product development (Yan et al., 2018). In most cases, if a manufacturer engages in both producing new product and 
remanufacturing, the remanufactured product typically erodes demand for new final products, leading to reduced demand for 
components. For instance, as an engine producer, Cummins produces both new and remanufactured engines (here, the engine 
is a final product of Cummins). Its remanufactured engines are used to replace broken ones in faulty vehicles (Shi et al, 2016). 
It is apparent that Cummins’ remanufactured engines compete with its new products, thereby reducing demand for engine parts 
such as bent axles. Another example is that automatic gearboxes used in many domestic automakers in China are bought from 
a Japanese firm, Aisin Group. As Chinese automakers start engaging in remanufacturing, demand for new automatic gearboxes 
from Aisin will be inevitably eroded. Similarly, Lenovo’s battery remanufacturing from used computers can decrease new 
battery purchases from Sanyo (Huang and Wang, 2017). In these situations, the manufacturer is not only a partner but also a 
competitor of the supplier. As the designer and producer of the key component, the supplier may modify its component design 
and pricing to contain potential profit erosion (Wu, 2013). The change in the component-design strategy presumably affects the 
design, production and remanufacturing of final products. Therefore, it is a worthy topic to investigate how the supplier and the 
manufacturer determine the remanufacturability level in their product design in a CLSC where the manufacturer collects and 
remanufactures used products. Based on existing literature (Debo et al., 2005; Wu, 2013), we define product (component) 
remanufacturability as the degree of difficulty that products (components) can be disassembled and recovered after use. 
More specifically, we model and investigate a two-echelon CLSC consisting of a key component supplier and a 
non-integrated manufacturer. Hereafter, without causing confusion, these two members are referred to as the supplier and the 
manufacturer, respectively. At the beginning of a period, the supplier determines the remanufacturability level and wholesale 
price of the key component (component hereafter), and the manufacturer decides the remanufacturability level of the final 
product excluding the component (product hereafter). The manufacturer purchases new components from the supplier and, 
then produces and sells new final products to consumers. At the end of the period, used products (including components) are 




that only the manufacturer engages in remanufacturing used products and the supplier does not remanufacture used 
components. The manufacturer relies heavily on the supplier for the key component in producing new final products, so the 
supplier is formulated as the leader and the manufacturer as the follower as depicted in Fig. 1.  
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Fig 1. The decision-making process of the supplier and manufacturer in the two-echelon CLSC. 
We address the following three main questions in this paper. 
(1) How does the supplier’s component-design strategy influence the manufacturer’s decisions, such as the final product 
design and the quantity of new and remanufactured products?  
(2) What is the manufacturer’s optimal remanufacturing strategy when the base unit remanufacturing cost (without 
accounting for product design) changes? How do different model parameters influence the two CLSC members’ optimal 
decisions, such as the wholesale price of the component, production quantities of new and remanufactured products, and 
the product-remanufacturability design choice?  
(3) How do the two CLSC members’ product-remanufacturability design strategies affect remanufacturing activity, economic 
and environmental performance of the CLSC? 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews related literature. Section 3 introduces the model 
settings, assumptions and notations. Section 4 investigates the CLSC model in the general form, where the supplier is the 
channel leader and both members consider adjusting their product-design strategies. We then derive the equilibriums for three 
scenarios under which either the manufacturer, the supplier, or none of them adjusts the product remanufacturability level. 
Section 5 analyzes the manufacturer’s remanufacturing strategy, equilibrium results, economic performance and environmental 
impact under different situations. Section 6 concludes the study with some remarks. For the sake of space, proofs are delegated 
to the Appendices.  
2. Literature review 
Extensive research has been conducted to examine different managerial decisions in CLSCs with remanufacturing such as 
strategic decisions, e.g., network design (Badri et al., 2017) and channel selection of CLCSs (Ma et al., 2017; Savaskan et al., 
2004; Savaskan and Van Wassenhove, 2006), tactical and operational decisions (Choi, 2017; DeCroix, 2006; Gaur et al., 2017; 
Ma et al., 2017; Yenipazarli, 2016). Our research focuses on operational decisions such as product design and pricing decisions 




competition, and product design in CLSCs with remanufacturing. 
The field of market segmentation and competition mainly consists of two streams. The first stream focuses on how the 
participants price new and remanufactured products in a non-competitive or a competitive context (Atasu et al., 2008; Ferrer 
and Swaminathan, 2010; Oraiopoulos et al., 2012). The second stream focuses on the decision interactions of multiple 
participants in the CLSC context. Research along this line typically assumes that consumer preference and demand are 
exogenous and explores the interaction between pricing or quantity decisions and other strategies such as product-design 
choices and collection strategies. For instance, game theoretic models are employed to investigate 
pricing/quantity/product-design decisions of an integrated manufacturer facing competition from IRs (Esenduran et al., 2017; 
Ferrer and Swaminathan, 2010; Majumder and Groenevelt, 2001; Örsdemir et al., 2014). In addition, some related literature 
studies economic and environmental consequences of remanufacturing. Earlier efforts conclude that remanufacturing generally 
enhances profitability and places less of burdens on environment (Atasu and Souza, 2013; Galbreth et al., 2013). But more 
recent research starts challenging this positive economic and environment profile of remanufacturing. For instance, Galbreth et 
al. (2013) show that remanufacturing can actually increase total raw material usage as the introduction of remanufactured 
products at a lower price increases overall demand. Xiong et al. (2013) point out that remanufacturing does not always benefit 
the members in a decentralized supply chain as it may lead to a win-lose, lose-lose or win-win situation contingent on the cost 
advantage of remanufacturing. Their results also indicate that a non-integrated manufacturer tends to produce more new 
products when new and remanufactured products are complements, thereby increasing the consumption of natural resources 
and energy, and aggravating environmental burdens. Gu et al. (2015) investigate environmental consequences of 
remanufacturing by defining a measure of environmental impact and reveal that production efficiency, green consumerism and 
production technology are not necessarily conducive to better environmental performance. Raz et al. (2017) investigate 
economic, environmental and social consequences of remanufacturing in a competitive setting, and find that remanufacturing 
worsens environmental impact but increases social welfare. 
Within the stream of product design, with increased environmental consciousness and regulation, different product design 
strategies have been proposed such as product eco-design, design for disassembly, design for (recycling) remanufacturing 
(Joshi and Gupta, 2019; Steeneck and Sarin, 2018). Many studies have been conducted to help designers choose 
environmentally friendly design choices (Joshi and Gupta., 2019) and to investigate the impact of product design on the 
operations of supply chain (Hong et al., 2019). Another rich body of literature studies remanufacturing-oriented product design 
and its impact on operating CLSCs with remanufacturing. Researchers have noted that a significant issue is the interplay 
between product design and pricing (quantity) decisions in the CLSC context. For instance, Debo et al. (2005) address a joint 
pricing and production technology selection problem faced by a manufacturer who considers introducing a remanufacturable 
product in a market with heterogeneous consumers. By treating the level of interchangeability (disassemblability) as an 
endogenous variable, Wu (2013) investigates the OEM’s product-design decision and the supply chain members’ competitive 
pricing strategies. The result shows that the product-design strategy is effective for the OEM in competing with the 
remanufacturer, but this does not necessarily hurt the remanufacturer’s profit. Qiang (2015) investigates the impact of 




market share in a two-period CLSC network. Shi et al. (2016) explore the effect of remanufacturable product design on market 
segmentation as well as product and trade-in prices by studying a two-stage profit-maximization problem. Subramanian et al. 
(2013) analyze how a firm’s component commonality decision affects its product line and profit. Their result shows that the 
OEM will not introduce component commonality into the product line if this design can greatly reduce remanufacturing cost 
for third-party remanufacturers. Steeneck and Sarin (2018) model the production economics of remanufacturing at 
part-durability level for a leased product and examine how the profit margin of remanufactured products and recovery rate of 
leased products affect the optimal part durability. Reimann et al. (2019) reveal that the optimal strategy of process innovation 
(like design for disassembly) in a forward supply chain is not directly applicable to the CLSC, and their study shows that a 
decentralized supply chain is easier to engage in remanufacturing than an integrated supply chain when the process innovation 
is costly. 
A general assumption in most existing literature is that a new product is designed and produced by an integrated 
manufacturer. But in reality, many products such as automobiles, personal computers, refrigerators, and air-conditioners are 
jointly designed and manufactured by non-integrated manufacturers and suppliers. In the automobile and personal computer 
industries, it is often the case that non-integrated manufacturers are heavily dependent on key component suppliers. Decisions 
of non-integrated manufacturers and suppliers interact with each other and influence the system efficiency. Up to now, limited 
research considers the role of a supplier when operational performance is examined for CLSCs. Xiong et al. (2013) and Xiong 
et al. (2016) recognize that previous studies (Aras et al., 2006; Jacobs and Subramanian, 2012) are carried out in a cooperative 
context, and there is no direct competition between a non-integrated manufacturer and a supplier. Their results demonstrate that 
the interaction between the supplier and non-integrated manufacturer can result in different economic and environmental 
outcomes in a co-opetitive context. Huang and Wang (2017) investigate the value of information sharing in 
supplier-remanufacturing and manufacturer-remanufacturing scenarios in a CLSC with a manufacturer, a supplier and a retailer. 
However, to the best of our knowledge, it remains open to explore the interplay between quantity decisions and the level of 
product remanufacturability chosen by the manufacturer and supplier in their product design. To close this gap in literature, we 
investigate how the CLSC members make decisions under product-remanufacturability design and further analyze the impact 
of product design on the economic and environmental performance of the CLSC. 
The key contribution of this work is an explicit incorporation of the CLSC members’ product-remanufacturability design 
into operational decisions in a two-echelon CLSC consisting of a supplier and a manufacturer. By formulating a general model 
to allow both the supplier and the manufacturer change their product remanufacturability in a supplier-dominated CLSC, we 
examine the interaction between the two CLSC members’ product-design decisions, explore the impact of product design on 
the manufacturer’s remanufacturing activity as well as operational performance of the CLSC. Our work reveals that 
remanufacturing is not always beneficial to the CLSC members or the environment, but adjusting product-design strategies can 
reduce the negative impact under certain conditions. More specially, in terms of the impact on profitability, when 
remanufacturing is successfully blocked by the supplier, or the manufacturer only remanufactures part of used product, the 
adjustment of the product-design strategy helps to contain the member’s profit loss when it suffers a reduction owing to 




both members’ profitability. For the environmental impact, when remanufacturing is successfully blocked by the supplier, the 
change of the product-design strategy mitigates negative environmental impact due to remanufacturing, and this result remains 
true under one certain condition when the manufacturer remanufactures part of used products. When the manufacturer 
remanufactures all used products, adjusting product design will aggravate the environmental burdens. Our research thus 
complements the stream of remanufacturing literature with a focus on product design and market segmentation.  
3. Model settings, assumptions and notations 
This research has the following two features. First, new components are produced by the supplier, new and 
remanufactured products are produced by the manufacturer. Remanufactured products do not need to purchase new 
components. As such, remanufacturing is conceived to erode demand for both new products and the supplier’s new 
components, and the manufacturer not only cooperates, but also competes with the supplier. Second, both the supplier and the 
manufacturer are concerned with their respective product-remanufacturability design, which directly affects the production cost 
of the new component and new final product as well as the remanufacturing cost. Below is a list of main assumptions 
concerning product design, cost structure, consumer preference, decision framework, environmental impact of new and 
remanufactured products. 
Product-design Choice. We assume that the supplier and manufacturer can change their respective product 
remanufacturability in the cooperative and competitive context. 
i  denotes that supplier’s and manufacturer’s choice of 
remanufacturability in their respective product, reflecting the remanufacturability level of i , where  ,i k o  represents the 
key component and final product. For the new product remanufacturability level 
o , we assume that it is the manufacturer’s 
product-design choice given the supplier’s component-design decision. This assumption is reasonable given that the supplier is 
modeled as the leader in this model. Based on existing literature (Wu, 2013), we assume [ 1,1]i  −  , where 1 0i−    
( 0 1i  ) denotes that the member adjusts its present product-design strategy to decrease (increase) the remanufacturability 
level, the used product is more (less) expensive to remanufacture. If the remanufacturability level equals 0, the member will 
not adjust its current product-design strategy. Conceptually, if the supplier feels that the manufacturer’s remanufacturing 
activity is a major threat for its component sales, it can adjust its component design to make it more expensive for the 
manufacturer to remanufacture used products, thereby mitigating cannibalization of demand for new components. Conversely, 
if the supplier can also benefit from the manufacturer’s remanufacturing activity, it is then motivated to adjust its component 
design to make its more remanufacturing friendly. We first analyze how the supplier’s component design and pricing decisions 
affect the manufacturer’s product design and production decisions in the general model. Then we focus on the pricing and 
quantity decisions, economic and environmental performance under three special scenarios when the supplier, manufacturer, or 
none adjusts its product-design strategy for remanufacturing. We also assume that a used final product can be remanufactured 
once at most. 
Cost Structure. A change in the product design incurs an additional fixed cost ( )iF   for the member before its 
production starts. Following Kim and Chhajed (2000), Mukhopadhyay and Setoputro (2005) and Biswas et al. (2018), we 
define ( )iF   as a quadratic function of i :
2( ) / 2i i iF   = , where i  is the sensitivity parameter of the additional fixed 
cost with respect to 










−  . It is clear that this cost is reduced to rc  
when none of the supplier or manufacturer changes its current product-design strategy, i.e., 0 =i , { , }i k o . For simplicity, 
we refer to cr as the base unit remanufacturing cost. 0 1i    represents the impact factor of product-remanufacturability 
design on remanufacturing cost. As for the impact of remanufacturability design on the unit production cost of a new 
component (a final product), following Debo et al. (2005) and Gu et al. (2015), we assume that a higher remanufacturability 
level requires a higher unit production cost for a new component (final product) due to the use of better materials and more 
customized production processes. As such, we define the unit production cost of a new component (final product) by i i ic  + , 
where 0 1i   is the impact factor of product-remanufacturability design on its unit production cost, ic  is the base unit 
production cost of a key component and a final product (excluding the component) under the current product-design strategy, 
and 0i i ic  +  . Following Xiong et al. (2013) and Xiong et al. (2016), we assume that each final product requires one key 
component and the base unit production cost of new final products is thus 
oc + , where   is the unit wholesale price of the 
key component, and 
r oc c +  (Giutini and Gaudette, 2003; Choi et al., 2013).  
Consumer Preference. Remanufactured products can have as good quality as new products; however, latest empirical 
evidence and experimental results show that consumers’ valuation of remanufactured products is generally lower (Agrawal et 
al., 2015; Guide Jr and Li, 2010). We assume that the potential market size is Q, and consumer’s willingness-to-pay   for the 
new product is heterogeneous and uniformly distributed on [0, ]Q .   is the consumer’s willingness-to-pay for the 
remanufactured product, (0,1)  . Let np  and rp  denote the prices of new and remanufactured products, respectively. 
The net utility of type   consumers from getting a new product, remanufactured product and no product is 
np − , rp −  
and 0, respectively. In a given period, consumers buy a product based on the net utility that they can derive from the purchase 
during the period (Debo et al., 2005; Li and Chen, 2018). Following Johnson and Myatt (2006), consumer choices lead to a 
new product price 
n n rp Q q q= − − , and remanufactured product price ( )r n rp Q q q= − − , where nq  and rq  denote the 
production quantity of new and remanufactured products, respectively. For simplicity, we normalize Q to 1 (Ma et al., 2017; 
Taleizadeh et al., 2017). At the same time, we assume that all new products can be sold, and the volume of sales is larger than 0 
when the manufacturer sells new products at the price of the unit production cost; therefore, 1 0o rc c − − + −  . 
Decision Framework. All decisions are considered in a steady state period (Örsdemir et al., 2014). In the general model, 
the supplier moves first to make its component-design decision and price the component, followed by the manufacturer’s 
product-design and production quantity decisions for new and remanufactured products. Both members are risk-neutral and 
pursue profit-maximization, and have complete information (Cachon and Lariviere, 1999; Goyal and Netessine, 2007). 
Generally, only a portion of used products can be collected and remanufactured. However, to keep our research focused, we 
consider the case that all used products are available for remanufacturing (Örsdemir et al., 2014; Reimann et al., 2019). 
Environmental Impact. Researchers and policy-makers share the same view that the environmental impact of a 
remanufactured product is much smaller than that of a new product in its life cycle as remanufacturing consumes less raw 
materials and energy. Following the convention in literature (Agrawal et al., 2012; Atasu and Souza, 2013; Örsdemir et al., 
2014), we assume that one unit of the new product and remanufactured product generates 
ne  and re  environmental impact, 
respectively, where 




products, the total environmental impact E  will be 
n n r re q e q+ . 
Table 1 summarizes the notations used in this manuscript. In addition, for a more concise description of equilibrium 
solutions, we denote 0 1 k oc c = + − , 1 1 k oc c = − − , 2 rc = − , and 3 ( )k o rc c c = + − , where 0 1 2 0     . 
Table 1. Parameters and decision variables. 
Symbol Definition 
Parameters 
rc  Base unit remanufacturing cost of a used product. 
kc  Base unit production cost of a new component. 
oc  Base unit production cost of a new final product excluding the component. 
ne / re  Unit environmental impact of a new/remanufactured product. 
  Consumer’s value discount for a remanufactured product. 
i  
Sensitivity parameter of additional fixed cost with respect to the component (i = k) 
and final product (i = o) remanufacturability level.  
i  
Impact factor of the change in i’s remanufacturability level on the unit production 
cost of the remanufactured product,  ,i k o . 
i   
Impact factor of the change in i’s remanufacturability level on the unit production 





The supplier’s and manufacturer’s product-design strategy for their component (i = k) 
and final product (i = o), respectively, reflected as the remanufacturability level.  
  Unit wholesale price of a new component. 
nq / rq  Production quantity of new/remanufactured final products. 
np / rp  Unit retail price of a new/remanufactured final product. 
E  
 
Total environmental impact. 
h
j  ( )j S M=  signifies the supplier (manufacturer) , ( )h N B=  indicates that none 
(both) of S and M adjust(s) their current product-design strategy, and ( )h S M=  
means that S (M) adjusts its product-design choice. 
4. Equilibrium analysis 
4.1 Equilibrium analysis of the general model  
In the general model, the supplier is the leader, and the manufacturer is the follower. This power structure is common in 
such industries as automobile and personal computer. Based on the assumptions in Section 3, the profit functions of the 
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The constraint means that all used product can be collected and remanufactured by the manufacturer, but the quantity of 
available used products is constrained by the units of new products (Örsdemir et al., 2014; Reimann et al., 2019). Given the 
supplier’s component wholesale price ( ) and remanufacturability level (
k ), the manufacturer’s optimal response is given by 
Proposition 1. 
Proposition 1. If 




  and 
k  are as follows. 
Case B-A: If 




































Case B-B: If 
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Case B-C: If 
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Proof. See Appendix A. 
Proposition 1 shows how the manufacturer determines its product-design strategy and production quantities given the 
supplier’s component wholesale price and remanufacturability choice. Rearranging 















− − + 
+
−
  − , corresponding to the case that remanufacturing has no cost advantage compared to 
producing new products (case B-A). In this case, no remanufacturing activity occurs, the manufacturer lowers the product 
remanufacturability level for lower unit production cost of new products ( 0B Ao
−  ). When remanufacturing has moderate cost 
savings (
1 2    ), the profit from remanufacturing offsets the loss from cannibalization of new product sales, and the 
manufacturer remanufactures a portion of used products (referred to as partial remanufacturing). In this case (case B-B), 
remanufactured products are substitutes for new products. Although there is remanufacturing activity, the remanufacturability 
level of the final product is not necessarily improved. An examination of the expression of B Bo
−  reveals that the manufacturer 
will enhance the final product remanufacturability level ( 0B Bo
−  ) if 
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; otherwise, it will lower 
its product remanufacturability level ( 0B Bo
−  ). When remanufacturing has overwhelming cost savings (
2  ), the 
manufacturer collects and remanufactures all used products (referred to as complete remanufacturing). In this case (case B-C), 
remanufactured products are complements of new products. The choice of the product-design strategy depends on 
o o − . If 
the product-design strategy has a greater impact on unit production cost of remanufactured products than that of new products 
(
o o   ), the product remanufacturability level is improved ( 0
B C
o
−  ); otherwise, it is lowered ( 0B Co
−  ).  
Corollary 1. (1) The quantity of new products always decreases in  , but it is independent of 
k  in case B-A and decreases 
(increases) in 
k  in case B-B (B-C); (2) The quantity of remanufactured products is independent of   and k  in case B-A, 
increases (decreases) in   in case B-B (B-C), increases in 
k  in cases B-B and B-C. 
Proof. See Appendix B. 
Corollary 1 describes the manufacturer’s optimal production quantity response given the supplier’s wholesale pricing   
and component-design choice 
k . It is natural that the quantity of new products always decreases in   as an increased   




and demand for remanufactured products remains zero. Due to given   and no remanufacturing activity, the manufacturer’s 
optimal response of new product production is independent of 
k . When   increases to the range of case B-B, new and 
remanufactured products coexist and remanufactured products are substitutes for new products, so demand for remanufactured 
products increases in  . In addition, a higher component remanufacturability 
k  enhances the relative cost advantage of 
remanufacturing and decreases (increases) demand for new (remanufactured) products. When   falls within the range of 
case B-C, remanufactured products are complements of new products. Then, the production quantity of new and 
remanufactured products both decrease in  . As for 
k , a higher value helps to lower remanufacturing cost, thereby 
enhancing demand for remanufactured products and the supplementary new products. As such, the quantities of new and 
remanufactured products both increase in 
k . 
Corollary 2. The product remanufacturability level increases (non-decreases) in   (
k ) in cases B-A and B-B, decreases 
(increases) in  (
k ) in case B-C if o o  . 
Proof. See Appendix C. 
Corollary 2 shows the manufacturer’s optimal product design response given the supplier’s wholesale pricing   and 
component-design choice 
k  for its component. In case B-A, as remanufacturing does not have sufficient cost advantage to 
cause any remanufacturing activity, the product remanufacturability level 
o  is effectively decoupled from the supplier’s 
component design strategy 
k . On the other hand, as the component’s wholesale price   increases, the relative cost 
advantage of producing new products shrinks and the manufacturer will take a less aggressive strategy to reduce its product 
remanufacturability level (a negative 
o  with a smaller magnitude). As such, o  increases in the component’s wholesale 
price  . When   increases to the range in case B-B where remanufactured and new products are substitutes, the 
remanufacturing cost advantage is strengthened by higher component’s wholesale price and remanufacturability level, 
stimulating the manufacturer to enhance its product remanufacturability level for remanufacturing. When the component’s 
wholesale price further increases to case B-C, the manufacturer’s product-design strategy depends on its impact on the unit 
production cost of new and remanufactured products. If 
o o  , the manufacturer enhances product remanufacturability level 
( 0B Co
−  ) and this level increases in  
k  and decreases in  . Otherwise, the reverse holds.  
Generally, given the manufacturer’s optimal response functions, one can derive the equilibrium solutions of supplier’s 
component pricing and remanufacturability design. However, given the complex interactions among the product design and 
other cost parameters in our general model, we cannot obtain the supplier’s optimal decisions analytically. To address this issue, 
we derive equilibrium solutions for three special scenarios: 0, 0k o = =  (scenario N), 0, 0k o =   (scenario M) and 
0, 0k o  =  (scenario S), and examine their managerial insights. Then, by numerical analysis in Section 5, we explore the 
robustness of these managerial insights in the general scenario, 0, 0k o    (scenario B). Hereafter, we use 
{ , , , }h N M S B  to index different scenarios.  
4.2 Equilibrium solutions of three special scenarios 
(1) Scenario N  
Scenario N is the benchmark case when none of the two members adjusts its current product-design strategy and, hence, 




component. Plugging it into the manufacturer's optimal decisions, the equilibrium solution under this scenario is given by: 
Case N-A : 0
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Proof. See Appendix D. 
The equilibrium solution under scenario N shows that the supplier has four cases about its component pricing as per the 
base unit remanufacturing cost 
rc . When rc  is too large to make remanufacturing profitable, the manufacturer will not 
engage in remanufacturing (case N-A) and the supplier prices its component by considering both members’ production costs. 
When 
rc  reduces to the range of case N-B-1, remanufacturing has moderate cost advantage, the manufacturer is motivated to 
remanufacture. However, given that remanufactured products cannibalizes the component’s demand, instead of competing with 
remanufactured products, a more profitable strategy for the supplier is to completely drive remanufactured products out of the 
market by aggressively pricing the component ( 1N B N A − − − ) after accounting for the base unit production cost of new and 
remanufactured products. When 
rc  further reduces to the range of case N-B-2, the significant cost advantage of 
remanufacturing induces the manufacturer to remanufacture part of used products and remanufactured products are substitutes 
for new products. When 
rc  falls into the range of case N-C, the overwhelming remanufacturing cost advantage motivates the 
manufacturer to remanufacture all used products. In this case, the new and remanufactured products are complements, and the 
supplier and the manufacturer are engaged in a cooperative relationship. In cases N-B-2 and N-C, the supplier prices the 
component by considering the market relationship between new and remanufactured products, as well as their base unit 
production costs.  
(2) Scenario M 
Under scenario M, the manufacturer is concerned with the final product’s remanufacturability, but the supplier does not 
change its current component-design strategy. Therefore, 0, 0k o =  . Based on Proposition 1 and the supplier’s profit 
function, the equilibrium solution is determined as follows. 
Case M-A: 0
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Proof. See Appendix E. 
As the structure of the equilibrium solution shows that the supplier’s decision under scenario M is similar to that under 
scenario N, we will not elaborate further for this scenario. 
(3) Scenario S 
Under scenario S, the supplier is concerned with the component remanufacturability, but the manufacturer does not 
change its current product-design strategy. Therefore, 0, 0k o  = . Based on Proposition 1 and the supplier’s profit function, 
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Proof. See Appendix F. 
Similarly, the equilibrium solution illustrates that the supplier’s pricing decision for the component under scenario S 
resembles that under scenario N. The supplier’s component-design decision is contingent upon the manufacturer’s 
remanufacturing activity. When the manufacturer does not remanufacture at all in cases S-A and S-B-1 or remanufactures part 
of used products in case S-B-2, lowering the component remanufacturability level not only reduces the component’s unit 
production cost, but also weakens market cannibalization from remanufactured products. Therefore, the supplier takes a 
negative attitude towards remanufacturability design of its component ( 0S Ak
−  ; 1 0S Bk
− −  ; 2 0S Bk
− −  ). When the 
manufacturer remanufactures all used products in case S-C, the new and remanufactured products are complements and the 
supplier’s optimal component-design strategy is determined by its impact on the base unit production cost of new components 
and remanufactured products. If it has a greater impact on the base unit production cost of remanufactured products than that of 
new components (
k k  ), improving the component remanufacturability level ( 0
S C
k
−  ) enhances the overwhelming 
remanufacturing cost advantage and brings in more remanufacturing profit for both members. The increase in remanufacturing 
profit surpasses the increased cost owing to the component-remanufacturability design. Otherwise, it is in the supplier interest 
to reduce the component remanufacturability level ( 0S Ck
−  ). 




This section starts with a further discussion of the manufacturer’s remanufacturing strategy and, then, characterizes the 
equilibrium decisions from the product-design and production perspectives. Next, a comparison is conducted for these 
equilibrium decisions under different scenarios. Subsequently, we analyze the supplier’s and the manufacturer’s profit with 
respect to the base unit remanufacturing cost 
rc . Finally, we assess the total environmental impact of new and remanufactured 
products. 
5.1 The manufacturer’s remanufacturing strategy  
By examining the equilibrium solutions under the three special scenarios, we find that the basic structure and property 
remain the same except that the thresholds of different cases may slightly shift for the three scenarios. The manufacturer’s 
remanufacturing strategy depends not only on the base unit remanufacturing cost, but also on consumer’s willingness-to-pay 
for remanufactured product. This result is presented in Proposition 2 and visually illustrated in Fig. 2. 
Proposition 2. Under scenario { , , }h N M S , if h  , the manufacturer has three possible remanufacturing strategies: no, 
partial, and complete remanufacturing; otherwise, it has only two optimal choices: no and complete remanufacturing.  
Proof. See Appendix G. 
Proposition 2 indicates that consumer’s willingness-to-pay for remanufactured products has a significant impact on the 
equilibrium solution structure. A higher consumer’s willingness-to-pay for remanufactured products implies a higher relative 
cost advantage for remanufacturing compared to producing new products, making it easier for the manufacturer to break the 
barrier for committing to remanufacturing. At a higher willingness-to-pay level, the manufacturer will skip the partial 
remanufacturing strategy and jump from no to complete remanufacturing at a higher base unit remanufacturing cost 
rc . This 
result is clearly shown in Fig. 2, where the manufacturer’s remanufacturing strategies differ at two willingness-to-pay levels 
0.72 =  and 0.55 = . The boundary value of 
rc  at 0.72 =  is higher than that at 0.55 =  for the manufacturer to 
shift its remanufacturing strategy under all of the four scenarios, and the manufacturer will skip the partial remanufacturing 
strategy at a higher willingness-to-pay level 0.72 = . 






(a) 0.55 =                                     (b) 0.72 =  
Fig 2. The manufacturer’s remanufacturing strategies ( 1.2k o = = , 0.4kc = , 0.2oc = , 0.07o = , 0.15k = , 0.14o = , 0.24k = )  




case when h  .  
5.2. Characterization of equilibrium decisions 
5.2.1 Characterization of equilibrium product-design decisions  
Result 1 characterizes the impact of different cost parameters on the product-design decisions under scenarios M and S, 
respectively. In this table, a “0” at the intersection of 




 indicates that the component (product) 
remanufacturability level is independent of 








 increases in 








 decreases in 


















 is independent of 




 decreases in 
kc . The other entries in Table 2 can be interpreted in the same fashion.  
Result 1. The following result holds.  


















cr 0 + -   
ck + (0,-) +   
co + (0,-) +   
Proof. See Appendix H. 
More specifically, when remanufacturing has no cost advantage compared to producing new products (case h-A), no 
remanufacturing takes place. In this case, the remanufacturability design of the component (product) takes a negative value to 
lower the unit cost of the new product, and it is independent of the base unit remanufacturing cost. On the other hand, an 
increase in 
oc  and kc  hurts the profit margin and demand for new products. By increasing the negative remanufacturability 
level of the component (final product), the savings on the fixed cost is more than enough to offset the profit loss due to lower 






oc  and kc  in case h-A.  
When 
rc  decreases to the region in case h-B-1, remanufacturing has moderate cost advantage and the manufacturer has 
motivation to remanufacture. However, the supplier under scenario M (scenario S) in this case takes an aggressive pricing (and 
component-design strategy) to block remanufacturing. While remanufacturing is blocked, the manufacturer under scenario M 
continues to lower product remanufacturability level (
1 0M B M Ao o 
− − −  , see the solid green line in Fig. 3(d)). Within this 
range, a higher rc  indicates more cost advantage of producing new products, allowing the manufacturer under scenario M 
(the supplier under scenario S) to take a less aggressive product-design strategy by increasing the product’s negative 
remanufacturability level. On the other hand, the remanufacturing cost advantage is independent of 
kc ( oc ) under scenario M 
but shrinks as 
kc ( oc ) increases under scenario S and, then the manufacturer determines the product-design strategy regardless 
of 
kc ( oc ) but the supplier has to take a more aggressive component-design strategy to effectively drive remanufactured 




( { , }h M S , { , }i k o ) increases in rc , but non-increases in kc  and oc .  
When the base unit remanufacturing cost 
rc  further reduces to the range of case h-B-2, the manufacturer engages in 
partial remanufacturing and remanufactured products are substitutes for new products. As 
rc  increases and kc ( oc ) decreases, 




products. This motivates the supplier (manufacturer) under scenario S (M) to further undermine demand for remanufactured 




( { , }h M S , { , }i k o ) decreases 
in 
rc , but increases in kc  and oc .  
When the base unit remanufacturing cost rc  falls in the range of case h-C, the supplier and the manufacturer are in a 
cooperative relationship. The impact of rc , kc  and oc  on component (product) remanufacturability design depends on the 
relationship between the impact factor on unit production cost of remanufactured products 
i  and that of new products 
i ( { , }i k o ). If i i  , the remanufacturability level of the component (final product) is improved, 0
h C
i
−  . In this case, 
as 
rc  increases, demand for remanufactured (subsequently, new) products will be reduced. Similarly, as kc  or oc  increases, 
demand for components and new (subsequently, remanufactured) products will also be reduced. These will dampen the 




 decreases in 




 increases in 
rc , kc , and oc  if i i  . 
To visually illustrate how the equilibrium product-design decision varies with different parameters, we select 
rc  as a 
representative parameter to plot the chart of k  and o  vs. rc  in Fig. 3(d) by setting 1.2o k = = , 0.5 = , 0.4kc = , 
0.2oc = , 0.3k = , 0.25o = , 0.12k = , and 0.07o = . The vertical dashed lines signify the boundaries between different 
cases for scenario S. The corresponding boundaries for scenarios N, M and B follow the same pattern as scenario S, but are 
slightly shifted. 
Fig.3(d) not only confirms the analytical results in Table 2 (row 
rc ), but also demonstrates how cr influences the 
remanufacturability level of the component and product under the general scenario B where 0, 0k o   . Fig. 3(d) shows 
that scenario B possesses the similar patterns of the remanufacturability levels of the component (
k ) and product ( o ) as well 
as the influence of 
rc  on them as those under scenarios S and M. Therefore, we infer that Result 1 can be extended to the 
general scenario B. 
5.2.2 Characterization of equilibrium production decisions 
Next, Result 2 demonstrates how equilibrium wholesale price and production quantity decisions are affected by 
rc , kc  
and 
oc  (Table 3). The notation in Result 2 is similar as that in Result 1. Symbols in a bracket such as “(0,0,+)” shows the 
corresponding relationship under scenario { , , }h N M S , respectively. 
Result 2. The following result holds. 
Table 3. The impact of parameters cr, ck and co on equilibrium wholesale price and production quantities  
Parameter h A −  h Anq
−  h A
rq
−  1h B − −  1h Bnq
− −  1h B
rq
− −  2h B − −  2h Bnq




 h C −  h Cnq
−  h C
rq
−  
rc  0 0 0 + - 
0 + + - - - - 
kc  + - 0 (0,0,+) (0,0,-) 
0 + - + + - - 
oc  - - 0 - (0,0,-) 
0 - - + - - - 
Proof. See Appendix I. 
Result 2 shows that the impacts of parameter kc  ( oc ) on the component wholesale price and the quantity of new 
products are the same in cases h-A, h-B-2 and h-C for the three special scenarios, but their impacts on the quantity of 
remanufactured products depend on the relation between new and remanufactured products. Recall that kc  is the base unit 




when kc  increases, the production cost of new products will be pushed higher owing to the heightened component price, 
thereby reducing demand for new products. When the manufacturer incurs a higher in-house production cost 
oc , the supplier 
is motivated to lower the component’s wholesale price to boost demand for components. Note that h A oc
− +  
( 1h B oc
− − + , 2h B oc
− − + ) is the unit production cost of new products. When oc  increases, the reduced component cost 
−h A  
( 1 − −h B , 2 − −h B ) is insufficient to cover the heightened oc , resulting in a higher unit production cost of and lower demand for 
new products. As for their impacts on the quantity of remanufactured products, when the manufacturer does not take up 
remanufacturing (case h-A), only new products are available in the market, the quantity of remanufactured products is always 
zero regardless of kc  
and 
oc . When the manufacturer commits to partial (complete) remanufacturing in case h-B-2 (case 
h-C), remanufactured products are substitutes (complements) of new products, so it is understandable that the quantity of 





h-B-2 (in contrary to demand for new products), but decreases in 
them in case
 
h-C (consistent with demand for new products).  
The impacts of rc  
on the equilibrium wholesale price and production quantities are also contingent upon the relation 
between new and remanufactured products in cases h-A, h-B-2 and h-C. In case h-A, only new products are available in the 
market, so 
rc  is irrelevant and has no effect on the wholesale price or the production quantities. 
In case h-B-2, 
remanufactured products are substitutes for new products, a higher 
rc  reduces demand for remanufactured products but 
increases demand for new products. This allows the supplier to exert less effort in competing with remanufactured products, 
leading to a higher wholesale price for its component. In case h-C, remanufactured products are complements of new products, 
as 
rc  increases, the demand for remanufactured products (and, hence, new products) will decrease, leading the supplier to 
reduce component wholesale price to enhance its demand.
 
When remanufacturing has moderate cost advantage (case h-B-1), the manufacturer is motivated to remanufacture but is 




. For the supplier, its aim is to 
completely drive remanufactured products out of the market. When pricing the component is the only tool available for the 
supplier to achieve this aim (under scenarios N and M), the supplier pegs on 
oc  and rc  regardless of k
c . However, when the 
supplier has two tools (aggressively pricing the component and lowering its remanufacturability level) to deter 
remanufacturing under scenario S, the combination of these two tools allows the supplier to act more rationally by increasing 
its wholesale price when 
kc  increases. Meanwhile, a higher rc  
(a lower 
oc ) indicates that the supplier can have a less 
aggressive wholesale pricing for its components. Therefore, 
1h B − −  increases in 
rc  and decreases in oc  under the three 
scenarios, but 
1 − −N B  and 1 − −M B
 
are independent of 
kc  and 
1 − −S B  increases in 







under the three scenarios, but 
1− −N B
nq  and 
1− −M B
nq  
are independent of 
kc  and 
1− −S B
nq  decreases in kc . As for oc , 




 depends on the base unit production cost of new products 
1h B
oc
− − + . As mentioned above, a higher 
oc  
leads to a lower 
1h B − − , and the increase in 
oc  is exactly canceled by the decrease in 
1h B − −  under scenarios N and M. But 
under scenario S, the increase in 
oc  outpaces the decrease in 
1 − −S B , resulting in a higher unit production cost of new 
products. Therefore, 
1− −N B
nq  and 
1− −M B
nq  
are independent of 





Fig. 3 visually displays how the base remanufacturing cost parameter cr affects equilibrium wholesale price of the 




between equilibrium variables and the base unit remanufacturing cost in Table 3, but also show that it qualitatively holds under 
scenario B. 
5.2.3 Comparison of equilibrium decisions across different scenarios 
Next, we shall vertically compare equilibrium decisions between scenarios M and N as well as between scenarios S and N 
and obtain Result 3 as follows. 
Result 3. (1) The wholesale price of the component under scenario M equals that under scenario N in cases h-A and h-C, but is 
higher (lower) than that in case h-B-1(h-B-2); the wholesale price under scenario S is lower (higher) than that under scenario N 
in cases h-A (h-B-1), is higher (lower) than that under scenario N in case h-B-2 and h-C if 
k k   (otherwise). (2) the 
quantities of new products under scenarios M and S are higher (lower) than those under scenario N in cases h-A, h-B-2 and h-C 
(h-B-1); the quantities of remanufactured products under scenarios M and S are lower (higher) than those under scenario N in 





Case S-C Case S-ACase S-B-1
Case S-B-2
 
(a) The optimal wholesale price of key components                (b) The optimal quantity of new products 







   (c) The optimal quantity of remanufactured products        (d) The remanufacturability level of the component and product 
Fig 3. Impact of cr on the equilibrium decisions  




When remanufacturing has no cost advantage (case h-A), the manufacturer will not commit to remanufacturing under any 
scenario. Compared to the base scenario N, the supplier under scenario S lowers its component remanufacturability level to 
reduce its marginal cost, allowing it to charge a lower wholesale price. Although the manufacturer under scenario M also 
lowers its product remanufacturability level to drive down its unit production cost, this adjustment affects only its own profit 
margin in producing new products and has no effect on the supplier’s wholesale pricing decision. As such, we have 
S A N A − −  , M A N A − −= , and then S A N An nq q
− −  and M A N An nq q
− − . By following the aforesaid argument, as both members 
will lower their product remanufacturability levels as shown in Fig. 3(d), we can infer that the component wholesale price 
under the general scenario B is lower than that under scenario N and demand for new products is the highest under scenario B 
compared to the other three special scenarios. If we zoom in the horizontal lines in case h-A in Fig. 3(a) and (b), we shall be 
able to confirm these relationships. 
When 
rc  decreases to the range in case h-B-1, the manufacturer has motivation to remanufacture but is effectively 
blocked from remanufacturing by the supplier. When all of the four scenarios fall within the range B-1, at the same 
rc , the 
scenario with more tools to block remanufacturing will be able to price the component higher (leading to lower demand for 
components and new products). As such, as illustrated in Fig. 3(a) and (b), scenario B has the highest wholesale price (the 
lowest demand for components and new products) as both members lower their product remanufacturability levels, followed 
by scenario S (the second lowest demand for new products) where the supplier’s lowering its component remanufacturability 
has a direct impact on the wholesale price and, then scenario M (the second highest demand for new products) when the 
manufacturer’s lowering its product remanufacturability has a secondary impact (deterring remanufacturing directly and 
enhancing new product production indirectly) on the wholesale price and, lastly, scenario N (highest demand for new products). 
For the same reason, we note that a lower base unit remanufacturing cost rc  (or a higher remanufacturing cost advantage) is 
needed for remanufacturing to arise as a profitable activity if the members adjust their product design. This is visually shown 
in Fig. 3(c), where scenario B requires the lowest rc , followed by a slightly higher rc  in scenario S, then, an even higher rc  
in scenario M and, lastly the highest rc  in scenario N for remanufacturing to arise in the equilibrium. Based on this line of 
thinking, we infer that the quantity of remanufactured products is smaller and the quantity of new products is larger under 
scenario B than those under the other three scenarios when the manufacturer commits to partial remanufacturing (case h-B-2) 
(see Fig. 3(b) and (c)). 
When all used products are remanufactured (case h-C), new and remanufactured products are complements. In this case, 
if 
i i  , both the supplier under scenarios S and B and the manufacturer under scenarios M and B will enhance their product 
remanufacturability levels (see Fig. 3(d)). The supplier’s positive component-design strategy pushes its production cost higher 
and allows it to charge a higher wholesale price for its component under scenarios S and B than that under scenario N. On the 
other hand, the downstream manufacturer’s product design does not affect the supplier’s component cost and, hence, the 
wholesale price of the component is the same for scenarios M and N (see case h-C in Fig. 2(a)). Compared to the base scenario 
N, the two members’ remanufacturing-friendly design facilitates remanufacturing and boosts demand for remanufactured 
products (subsequently, complementary new products) under scenarios S, M, and B. If 
i i  , both the supplier under 




negative component-design strategy drives down its marginal production cost, leading to a lower wholesale price for its 
component under scenarios S and B than that under scenario N. For the same reason, the manufacturer’s negative 
product-design choice under scenario M does not impact the supplier’s wholesale price decision for the component. 
Understandably, the negative product design ( 0h Ci
−  ) drives down the unit production cost of new products and boosts 
demand for new products (and, hence, complementary remanufactured products). Fig 2, 3(b) and 3(c) show that demand for 
remanufactured products (and, hence, new products) is the highest under scenario B and is the lowest under scenario N for the 
same cr in the common range in case h-C. 
In summary, these analyses allow us to make inference on the relationship between the general scenario B and the base 
scenario N. In case h-B-1, scenario B is most effective in deterring the manufacturer from remanufacturing, followed by 
scenario S when the supplier is concerned with component design and, then, scenario M when the manufacturer adjusts product 
design, and lastly none is concerned under scenario N. In case h-B-2, demand for remanufactured (new) products is the 
smallest (largest) under scenario B as it is the last to enter remanufacturing compared to the other three scenarios. In case h-C, 
simultaneous changes of component and product remanufacturability choices boost demand for new and remanufactured 
products to the highest level under scenario B compared to the other three special scenarios. 
5.3. Profit analysis 
Result 4 characterizes the profits of the supplier and manufacturer with respect to the base unit remanufacturing cost rc . 
Result 4. In case h-A ( { , , }h N M S ), the supplier’s and manufacturer’s profits are independent of rc . In cases h-B-1 and 
h-B-2, the supplier’s profit increases in rc , but the manufacturer’s profit decreases in rc . In case h-C, both the supplier’s and 
manufacturer’s profits decrease in rc . 
Proof. See Appendix K. 
Fig. 4 visually confirms the trend of profit changes with the value of rc  as given in Result 4. It is understandable that the 
two members’ profits are independent of rc  in case h-A as no remanufacturing is involved. In this case, the two members can 
achieve the highest profitability under scenario B compared to the other three special scenarios (see Fig. 4(a) and 4(b)) owing 
to the lowest production cost of new components and final products caused by their negative product-design strategies. When 
rc  decreases to the range in case h-B-1, the manufacturer has motivation to remanufacture but is blocked completely by the 
supplier’s aggressive strategy. The supplier’s aggressive strategy costs it a fortune with a reduced profit, and the lower the rc , 
the more aggressive the supplier’s deterring strategy, and the lower the profit. Conversely, the manufacturer ’s possibility of 
getting into remanufacturing serves as an effective tool to strengthen its profit at the expense of the supplier, and the lower the 
rc , the higher the manufacturer’s profit. As a matter of fact, the aforesaid trend is extended to case h-B-2, where 
remanufacturing cannot be completely driven out of the market. Furthermore, as shown in Fig. 4, the supplier in cases h-B-1 
and h-B-2 achieves the highest profit under scenario B owing to its more deterring tools at its disposal. Finally, if rc  
continues declining to case h-C, all used products are remanufactured. In this case, the supplier will price its components 
higher to enjoy the favourable market condition and the lower the rc , the higher the wholesale price and the supplier’s profit. 
On the other hand, the manufacturer will also benefit from a lower rc  and the lower the rc , the higher the manufacturer’s 





In addition, Fig. 4 clearly shows that, compared to the benchmark case h-A, when rc  enters into the range of cases h-B-1 
and h-B-2, the supplier’s profitability suffers a continuous decline (
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manufacturer enjoys a continuous enhanced profitability as rc  decreases (
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If rc  continues decreasing into the range of case h-C, the supplier’s profit starts increasing when rc  decreases 
(
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 =  ), but the manufacturer’s profit suffers a sudden drop first (
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   ) before climbing 
up when rc  decreases further. Therefore, when rc  falls into case h-C but is not efficient enough, both the supplier and the 
manufacturer are worse off in profitability compared to the benchmark case h-A. For low enough rc , remanufacturing makes 
both members better off. From a managerial perspective, the manufacturer has the motivation to invest in remanufacturing 
technology so that rc  is reduced to the ranges of h-B-1 and h-B-2 where its profitability is enhanced. Even if the 
manufacturer’s profit will first drop when rc  enters case h-C from the right, it will eventually achieve a higher profitability 
than the benchmark case with further investment in remanufacturing technology to bring rc  down to the lower end of h-C. As 
a matter of fact, the supplier will also invest in changing component-design strategy in this case to enjoy a better profit. At a 
sufficiently low level of rc  in case h-C, remanufacturing benefits both members in profitability, resulting in a win-win 
scenario for both CLSC members. 







(a) The profit of the supplier                      (b) The profit of the manufacturer 
Fig 4. The effect of cr on the profits of the supplier and the manufacturer under four scenarios. 
5.4. Environmental impact analysis 
Based on the assumption on environmental impact of new and remanufactured products in Section 3 and equilibrium 
production quantities in Section 4, Result 5 can be obtained by analyzing the total environmental impact as a function of the 
base unit remanufacturing cost rc  under scenario { , , }h N M S . 
Result 5. (1) The total environmental impact of both new and remanufactured products is independent of 
rc  in case h-A, and 
decreases in 













By using the same model parameter values in Fig. 3, one can draw the total environmental impact as a function of rc  for 
the four scenarios in Fig. 5. Once again, the vertical dashed lines are the boundaries of different cases for scenario S and 
identical to those in Fig. 3 and 4.  
Based on Result 2 and the calculation of the total environmental impact, it is understandable that the total environmental 
impact of both new and remanufactured products is independent of 
rc  in case h-A, and decreases in rc  
in cases h-B-1 and 
h-C for scenarios N, M, and S. Fig. 5 further confirms that the aforesaid relationships remain true for the general scenario B. 
However, in case h-B-2, both new and remanufactured products are present and substitutable in the market, a lower rc  
enhances demand for remanufactured products but depresses demand for new products. In this situation, the change of the total 
environmental impact depends on 
n re e . Given that ne  and re  are the unit environmental impact of the new and 
remanufactured product, respectively, 
n re e  can be employed to represent the relative environmental advantage of the 
remanufactured product. The larger the 
n re e , the higher the environmental advantage of the remanufactured product. When 








 ), a smaller rc  will result in a lower total environmental impact (see Fig. 5(b)). On the 
other hand, if 
n re e  is not sufficiently high (i.e. 
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), a more 
efficient rc  will actually cause an increase in the total environmental impact (see Fig. 5(a)).  
By taking the environmental impact in case h-A as a benchmark, we can further confirm that the total environmental 
impact is lower than that in the benchmark case for scenario h if 
5 2 3max{0, } { , }
h h h
r r r rc c com c c  ; otherwise, the total 
environmental impact is higher than that in the benchmark case for scenario h, where 5
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. This result clearly indicates 
that a more favorable environmental impact can only occur in case h-C. Fig. 5 shows this result graphically. Due to the limited 
display space, both Fig. 5(a) and 5(b) are truncated at =0.25rc . If the declining lines in case h-C are extended further to the 
left (smaller rc ), it is possible that the total environmental impact may exceed the benchmark case. Therefore, 
remanufacturing activity is not always beneficial to the environment regardless of the supplier’s and the manufacturer’s 
product-design strategies.  
A vertical comparison of the total environmental impact between scenarios M and N as well as between scenarios S and N 
leads to Result 6 as follows. 
Result 6. The total environmental impact under scenarios M and S is higher (lower) than that under scenario N in cases h-A and 
h-C (h-B-1). It is also higher than that under scenario N in case h-B-2 if 1 2max{ , }n re e E E . 
Proof. see Appendix M. 
Based on Result 3 and the calculation of the total environmental impact, it is understandable that the total environmental 
impact under scenarios M and S is higher (lower) than that under scenario N in cases h-A and h-C (h-B-1). The situation in case 
h-B-2 is more complicated: adjusting the product-design strategy enhances demand for new products but reduces demand for 
remanufactured products. If 1 2max{ , }n re e E E , each unit of new product presumably generates significantly larger 




reduced demand for remanufactured products cannot cover the increased environmental impact due to enhanced demand for 
new products, leading to a higher total environmental impact under scenarios M and S than that under scenario N. On the other 
hand, if 1 21 min{ , }n re e E E  , the decreased environmental impact from reduced demand for remanufactured products 
surpasses the increased environmental impact from heightened demand for new products, resulting in a lower total 
environmental impact under scenarios M and S than that under scenario N. By following the aforesaid argument, we can infer 
that the total environmental impact under the general scenario B is higher (lower) than that under scenario N in case h-A and 
h-C (h-B-1), and it is also higher than that under scenario N in case h-B-2 if 
n re e  is sufficiently large. Fig. 5 visually 
illustrates this result.  
Results 5 and 6 indicate that, if the manufacturer has motivation but is effectively blocked from remanufacturing, both 
members should be encouraged to adjust their product-design strategies to reduce the environmental impact. If remanufactured 
products are substitutes for new products, the two members should only be encouraged to adjust their product-design strategies 
if 
n re e  is not too high. When remanufacturing has overwhelming cost advantage, the manufacturer should be encouraged to 
remanufacture all used product because it produces a lower environmental impact than the benchmark case (no 
remanufacturing). But this encouraging policy has a limit: if remanufacturing is too efficient (i.e. 5
h
r rc c ), dumping of 
remanufactured products may cause harm to environment. In addition, as the total environmental impact under scenario N is 
the lowest compared to the other three scenarios (see Fig. 5), it is environmentally unwise to encourage the supplier or the 
manufacturer to change product design in this case. As we can see from Fig. 4 and Fig. 5, there exists a common range of cr in 
case h-C such that remanufacturing achieves a triple-win result where both members’ profitability will be enhanced and the 
total environmental impact will be reduced compared to the base case h-A. Committing to product design by the members in 
this case further strengthens their profitability at the expense of environment, but this will not materially change the triple-win 
situation. This result has significant policy implications: From a policy-maker’s perspective, the regulator can provide a 
subsidy to reduce cr if it is too high or impose an environmental fee to increase cr if it is too low so that rc  falls within the 
appropriate triple-win range that benefits both environment and the two members.  
Case S-C Case S-ACase S-B-1
Case S-B-2
 
Case S-C Case S-ACase S-B-1
Case S-B-2
 
(a) en=3 and er=1.2                                     (b) en=3 and er=0.6 





Product design has an important impact on remanufacturing of used products and it interacts with other pricing and/or 
production quantity decisions. Although current literature has already explored this issue, most studies assume that products 
are designed and produced by an integrated manufacturer. This assumption is inconsistent with industrial practices as it ignores 
the important role of suppliers in product design, production and remanufacturing. In this paper, we model a two-echelon 
CLSC consisting of a key component supplier and a non-integrated manufacturer. The supplier controls the 
remanufacturability level of the key component and the non-integrated manufacturer determines the remanufacturability level 
of the final product (excluding the key component), purchases key components from the supplier to produce new products, and 
remanufactures used products. Thus, their relationships can be both competitive and cooperative. The general model 
formulates their interaction in a single-stage analytic framework where the supplier is the leader, followed by the manufacturer, 
and both members adjust their product-design strategies. The base unit remanufacturing cost is adopted as the key parameter to 
characterize the equilibrium solution structure and examine the manufacturer’s remanufacturing strategy. We then explore how 
different model parameters affect product-design and production quantity decisions. Subsequently, we assess how the base unit 
remanufacturing cost and different product-design strategies influence the profitability of the two members and environmental 
performance of the CLSC. Key findings are as follows.  
In the supplier-dominated CLSC, the manufacturer’s decision to commit to no, partial, and complete remanufacturing is 
contingent upon the remanufacturing cost advantage and consumer’s willingness-to-pay for remanufactured products. If 
consumer’s willingness-to-pay is sufficiently high for remanufactured products, the manufacturer may skip partial 
remanufacturing and jump from no to complete remanufacturing directly as the base unit remanufacturing cost decreases. 
When remanufacturing has moderate cost advantage, the supplier and manufacturer can employ negative product design on top 
of the supplier’s aggressive component pricing strategy to block remanufacturing more effectively.  
The supplier’s component-design strategy has a significant impact on the manufacturer’s product-design strategy and 
production quantity of new and remanufactured products. When the manufacturer does not remanufacture, it takes a negative 
product-design strategy, and this strategy and the quantity of new products are independent of the component 
remanufacturability level. When the manufacturer commits to partial remanufacturing, as the supplier’s component 
remanufacturability level increases, the manufacturer’s product remanufacturability level and the quantity of remanufactured 
products increase, but the quantity of new products decreases. When the manufacturer remanufactures all used products, as the 
supplier’s component remanufacturability level increases, the quantity of new and remanufactured products increases, but the 
manufacturer’s product remanufacturability decision is contingent upon the impact of this decision on the unit base production 
cost of remanufactured and new products. 
Remanufacturing is not always beneficial to the CLSC members or the environment, but adjusting product-design 
strategies can reduce the negative impact under certain conditions compared to the scenario when none of them changes its 
product-design strategy. When the manufacturer has motivation to remanufacture but is completely blocked or commits to 
partial remanufacturing, the manufacturer benefits, but the supplier suffers and this loss can be curbed by adjusting their 




mitigate the negative environmental impact. On the other hand, when remanufacturing has overwhelming cost advantage and 
the manufacturer remanufactures all used products, our analysis indicates that there exists an appropriate range of the base unit 
remanufacturing cost such that both members enjoy higher profitability at a lower total environmental impact. In this case, 
implementing product design will further boost profitability at the expense of environment, but the triple-win result in both 
members’ profitability and environmental performance will not be sacrificed. Policy implications are that the regulator can 
foster the triple-win result by imposing an environmental fee or furnishing a subsidy.  
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Appendices: Supplementary materials 
Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 1 
The Lagrangian and the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions for the manufacturer’s optimization problem are 
stated as follows:  
1 2
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where 1  and 2  
are Lagrangian multipliers. According to the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker condition, there are four possible cases 
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Case II: When 
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the condition for Case II as 
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Case III: If 
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confirmed by the Complementary Relaxation Theorem. Solving equation 0B C B Cn rq q
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Case IV: If 
1 0   
and 
2 0  , 
0B D B Dn rq q
− −= =  can be verified by the Complementary Relaxation Theorem, 
corresponding to a case without any production activity, which should be neglected.
 
Proposition 1 is thus proved. 
 
Appendix B. Proof of Corollary 1 
By examining the relevant first order partial derivatives, the sensitivity analyses of the manufacturer's decisions of the 
optimal quantity of new and remanufactured product decisions with respect to   and 
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Corollary 1 is thus confirmed. 
 




By examining the relevant first order partial derivatives, the sensitivity analyses of the manufacturer's decision of the 
optimal product remanufacturability level with respect to the   and 
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Given that 22 (1 3 ) ( 0)o o o  + −  −  is equivalent to the condition that guarantees the existence of optimal solutions in 

































Corollary 2 is thus confirmed. 
 
Appendix D. Proof of equilibrium solution under scenario N 
The Lagrangian and the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions for the manufacturer’s optimization problem are 
stated as follows:  
1 2( , ) (1 ) ( (1 ) ) ( )
N
M n r n r o n n rr nr rrL q q q q c q q q c q q qq    = − − − − + − +− − − + ,  
11 2 2 0
N
n n r oM q q q cL     = − − − − + = ,  
1 22 2 0r r
N
rM nq c q qL       = − − − − + = ,  
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0n rq q−  , 0rq  ,  
where 1  and 2  
are the Lagrangian multipliers. According to the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker condition, four possible cases exist 
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( )r oc c  +  is derived from ( )2 = 0r oc c  − +   , corresponding to the condition for Case I and denoted by N-A. This 
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Case II: When 
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and 
2 0 = , the optimal solutions are ( )
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can then be obtained from the Complementary Relaxation Theorem. Therefore, we obtain the 
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Case III: If 
1 0   
and 
2 0 = , 
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Solving equation 0N C N Cn rq q
− −− =  yields 
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Case IV: If 
1 0   
and 
2 0  , 
N D N D
n rq q
− −=  and 0N Drq
− =  can be verified by the Complementary Relaxation 
Theorem, which means a case without any production activity and, hence, can be neglected.
 
























 into the constraints 
0N B N Bn rq q
− −−   and 0
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−  , we obtain the new constraints. Thereafter, the Lagrangian and the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker 
optimality conditions for the supplier’s optimization problem are stated as follows: 
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Case I: If 
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Case II: When 
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is due to 0
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Case III: If 
3 0 =  and 4 0 = , the optimal solution is 
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  Case IV: When 
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and C: cr = . The two intervals OA and BC correspond to the tight constraints 0
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− = , respectively. The interval AB corresponds to the loose constraint 0
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By backward induction, substituting 
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Figure A.1. The location of each boundary point on the cr-axis. 
It is understandable that the supplier’s profit function takes different forms when cr is located in different segments of 
values as shown in Fig. A.1. Let ( )MN rc  
denote the supplier’s profit function when cr falls in the interval between point M 
and N, corresponding to different constraints in the manufacturer’s optimal decisions. In the interval OA(PC), 
( ) ( ) 0 for ( )OX r OA r r k oc c c c c −   +  
( ( ) ( ) 0PC r BC rc c −   
for (1 )
2
k o rc c c

+ +   ) means that when cr is small 
(large) enough to fall within the range in case N-C (N-A), the supplier can enjoy higher profit under the loose constraint. 
Depending on where X is located, the following three possible cases may arise: 
Case I: If 10
3
  , X lies between point A and B. 
In this case, ( ) ( ) 0OX r OA rc c −   
always holds for interval OA ( )r k oc c c + . When cr falls between A and X, 
solving ( ) ( ) 0OX r AB rc c − =  for cr, we obtain 
1
1rc x=  
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1x <X<B. It is apparent that 
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should be discarded as it is outside the interval AX. In addition, 21( ) ( ) 0 for ( )OX r AB r k o rc c c c c x −  +  
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2
1x . 
Case II: If 1 1
3 2
  ,  point X lies between point B and P. For interval OA, Case I already confirms that 
( ) ( ) 0OX r OA rc c −   
always holds. For interval AB,
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when B <cr< P . 
Therefore, in Case II, the new component pricing decisions are the same as those in case I. 
Case III: If 1 1
2
  , point X lies between point P and C. 
The optimal solution is divided into two subcases: 
The first subcase III_I: When 1 2
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means that ( ) ( ) 0OX r BC rc c −   when B <cr< P. In this case, the new component pricing decisions are the same as those in 
case I. 
The second subcase III_II: When 2 1
3








hold, indicating that 
( ) ( ) 0OX r AB rc c −   for A<cr<B and 0AX BC −   for B<cr<C. In this case, the new component pricing decisions are 













k o rc c c 
− − = + − + − , if 
1
2x  







k o rc c c 
− = + − − + , if O < cr < 
1
2x . 
In summary, if 20
3
  , X can fall within any segment between A and C. Under this scenario, A< 21x <B holds and an 
optimal wholesale price exists. If 2 1
3
  , point X must fall between P and C. Under this circumstance, B < 12x <P holds 
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Equilibrium solution under scenario N is thus verified. 
 
Appendix E. Proof of equilibrium solution under scenario M 
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Appendix F. Proof of equilibrium solution under scenario S 
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Appendix G. Proof of Proposition 2 
Under scenario N, comparing 2
N
rc  with 3
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rc , one can confirm that 2 3
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rc  is less than 3
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rc  and case N-B-2 disappears. As such, the manufacturer is left with two remanufacturing 
strategies: no and complete remanufacturing. On the other hand, if N  , 2
N
rc  is larger than 3
N
rc  and case N-B-2 arises. In 
this case, the manufacturer has three remanufacturing strategies: no, partial and complete remanufacturing. The proofs for 
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Proposition 2 is thus proved. 
 
Appendix H. Proof of Result 1 
By examining the relevant first order partial derivatives, we derive the sensitivity analysis result of the equilibrium 
product design decisions on model parameters rc , kc , and oc  as follows:
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Once again, the optimality conditions 22 (1 3 ) ( 0)o o o  + −  −   and 
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Result 1 is thus confirmed. 
 
Appendix I. Proof of Result 2 
By examining the relevant first order partial derivatives, we obtain the following sensitivity analysis result of the 
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By the following first order partial derivatives, we derive the sensitivity analysis result of the equilibrium decisions with 
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This concludes the proof of Result 2. 
 
Appendix J. Proof of Result 3 
Comparing the equilibrium component wholesale price and the quantities of new and remanufactured products under 
scenario M and S with those under scenario N, one can confirm that: 
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Appendix K. Proof of Result 4 
By examining the relevant first order partial derivatives, we confirm the following sensitivity analysis result for the two 
members’ equilibrium profits with respect to rc .
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Result 4 is thus proved. 
 
Appendix L. Proof of Result 5 
By examining the relevant first order partial derivatives, one derives the following sensitivity analysis result for the total 
environmental impact of both new and remanufactured products with respect to rc .
 
(1) 0

































   
− − + 
−




























































































2 2 (2 (2 ) ( ))
2 (4 (1 ) ( ) )
S B




e     
   










( 2 ) (2 ) 21
( )
4 2 (1 ) 2 2
r o o n o o o r o
M B
o o o o or o o
E e e e
hc
     
    
− − − + + 
−

































. Under scenario S, if 
2 (2 ) ( )
2




   
 



























o o o o o
o o
n
r o o o
e
e
    




























(2 2 2 ) ( )
2
k k k k
k
   
 
 − − + −







o o o o o
o o o o o


    


























Result 5 is thus proved. 
 
Appendix M. Proof of Result 6 
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Result 6 is thus proved. 
